The Normative Aspect of the Concept of φύσις and the Origin of the Naturalistic Fallacy

Abstract

Автор статьи анализирует понятия νόμος и φύσις, которые являлись ключевыми для греческой философии и политико-правовой мысли Греции V-IV вв. до н.э. In the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. there were two key-words of the Greek philosophical, political and legal thought — νόμος and φύσις. The νόμος — φύσις antinomy constituted a tool of legal and political criticism. Undoubtedly the concept of νόμος comprises a prescriptive and normative aspect. However, an initially descriptive term φύσις raises doubts as to its prescriptive connotations. This paper deals with the history of the normative aspect of φύσις from Anaximander to Socrates and Plato. The analysis of the sources confirms that there was a distinct process of saturation of the term φύσις with prescriptive and normative meaning. In this tendency of φύσις to become the category of ethical judgment the author reveals the origin of the naturalistic fallacy. The idea of combining the descriptive and prescriptive connotations in one term coincides in time with the emergence of the “is-ought” issue described by David Hume.